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INTRODUCTION
In their wide-ranging and thought-provoking article, A Market for
Sovereign Control, Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati argue that
territorial sovereignty is a commodity that can and should be subject to
market forces.1 In this Response, I first identify the two different types
of deals—friendly and hostile—that can occur within a market for
sovereign control. I then discuss some of the obstacles that may impede
the successful conclusion of each type of deal.
In friendly deals, all of the affected parties consent to the transfer
of territory from one sovereign to another. The most significant
barriers to friendly deals are not legal. They are political. In the
modern era, there are few (if any) incentives for national political
leaders on the seller side to participate in such a market. Until these
incentives change, I argue, it is unlikely that a robust market for
sovereign control will develop with respect to friendly deals.
In hostile deals, one sovereign refuses to consent to the
annexation of one of its regions by another sovereign. In these
situations, Blocher and Gulati argue that the rules of international law
should be rewritten to permit the annexation over the objections of the
Copyright © 2017 John F. Coyle.
† Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797,
799–800 (2017).
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original sovereign provided certain conditions are met. I argue that the
nations of the world are unlikely to consent to the rewriting of these
rules. I argue further that there is no obvious means—short of the use
of force—by which these new rules could be enforced against nations
that refuse to obey them. Until these rule-making and rule-enforcing
obstacles are overcome, it is also unlikely that a robust market for
sovereign control will develop with respect to hostile deals.
I. FRIENDLY DEALS IN THE MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CONTROL
In a friendly deal for sovereign control, all of the relevant parties
consent to the transfer of sovereignty. The existing parent nation
agrees to sell the region. The new parent nation agrees to buy the
region. And the population of the affected region votes to proceed with
the transfer. There is nothing in customary international law (CIL) that
currently prohibits nations from engaging in friendly deals.2 If the
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were to work out an
agreement whereby sovereign control over Northern Ireland would be
transferred to Ireland in exchange for a large sum of money, subject to
the approval by the people of Northern Ireland, it would be entirely
permissible under contemporary CIL. This fact notwithstanding, and
despite the fact that the historical record is replete with examples of
friendly deals for sovereign control, they are essentially unknown in
contemporary international relations.
If friendly deals are permitted under international law, and if such
deals were common in the past but no longer occur today, then the
question that naturally arises is why. The answer is that the practice is
no longer politically viable. Blocher and Gulati acknowledge this. They
observe that nations may resist the transfer of sovereignty because they
view the loss of territory as a blow to their national pride.3 Blocher and
Gulati then go on to argue, however, that economic self-interest may
trump national pride under certain conditions. Specifically, they argue
that freely negotiated sales of sovereign control are most likely to occur
when the following factors are present:

2. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1996); cf. Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (2014) (discussing the
history of friendly deals among states in the United States).
3. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 829.
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Low or non-existent population in the region;
Economic crisis in the parent nation;
Identifiable physical resources in the region;
Simple boundaries, as in the case of islands;
The existence of cross-border affinities between the region
and another country;
6) Linkages between regions and forms of compensation;
7) Lack of a history of violent conflict; and
8) High-functioning domestic institutions.4
One could debate which direction several of these factors cut. The
presence of valuable physical resources in the region, for example, may
actually make it more difficult to agree to a price than would be the
case in their absence. Negotiations over barren tundra are likely to be
less fraught than negotiations over oil fields. Overall, however, this list
of factors illustrates the “best-case scenario” under which mutually
agreeable transfers of sovereign control are most likely to occur. Even
when many of these factors are met, however, history suggests that the
political obstacles to such voluntary transfers remain formidable.
Consider the case of Hans Island. Hans Island is located between
Canada and Greenland.5 It is tiny (less than half a square mile) and
uninhabited. Not counting seals, there are no known natural resources
on the island. It is, quite literally, a rock in the middle of the Arctic
Ocean. Over the past forty years, Canada and Denmark have
squabbled as to which country owns Hans Island on a number of
occasions. In 2005, the Canadian defense minister landed on the island
and erected a Canadian flag.6 Denmark responded by filing a
complaint stating that “we consider Hans Island to be part of Danish
territory, and will therefore hand over a complaint about the Canadian
minister’s unannounced visit.”7 The dispute continues to this day.
The Hans Island conflict presents a number of promising factors
from the list above. The Island is uninhabited. The physical resources

4. Id. at 837–38.
5. Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential
Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 263,
263 (2007).
6. Id.
7. Hans Off! Canada and Denmark’s Arctic Dispute, WORLDATLAS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/hans-island-boundary-dispute-canada-denmark-territorial-conflict.
html [https://perma.cc/8XVG-CV9S].
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on the island are known and (presumably) easy to value. The island has
clearly defined boundaries. There is no history of violent conflict
between Canada and Denmark. And both nations have highfunctioning domestic institutions. Hans Island would seem to be the
ideal case in which one nation might be willing to sell a region to
another nation for the right price. And yet the dispute endures. It
seems impossible to imagine that the governments of Canada and
Denmark are unaware that the sale of sovereign control is permissible.
In the past, each nation has negotiated for the sale or purchase of
territory.8 Instead, it appears that each government has decided that
the political costs of “losing” a piece of territory to another nation—
even if that territory is a rock in the middle of the Arctic Ocean—
outweigh the monetary benefits to be gained from its sale.
A similar dynamic can be seen with respect to the chain of eight
islands—known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu
Islands in China—located in the East China Sea.9 These islands, like
Hans Island, are small and uninhabited. Unlike Hans Island, however,
these islands offer rich fishing grounds and are geographically
proximate to oil and gas reserves.10 Although the islands are currently
controlled by Japan, China asserts that they have been part of its
territory since the sixteenth century.11 There is, again, no rule of
international law standing in the way of a cash settlement to resolve
the dispute. Such a settlement seems unlikely to occur, however,
because each interested government perceives the political costs of
selling territory to a rival to outweigh any possible sum of cash that
might be offered in exchange.
Political scientists use the term “audience costs” to describe the
penalty that a national leader incurs when he is seen to back down in
an international crisis.12 When the crisis involves a dispute over a
nation’s territory, the threat of such a penalty—up to and including
8. In 1916, Denmark sold several islands in the West Indies to the United States for $25
million. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 682. In 1870, Canada purchased
a vast swath of territory known as Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company for 300,000
pounds. Michael Jeffery, Public Lands Reform: A Reluctant Leap into the Abyss, 16 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 79, 93 (1996).
9. See Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku
Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 903–04 (2008).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 577 (1994).
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removal from office—is particularly serious because territorial
disputes with other nations tend to galvanize public opinion in a way
that many other international disputes do not.13 As Douglas Gibler and
Marc Hutchison have argued:
Not all foreign policies will be salient to the public since crises vary so
widely in their importance to the average individual. Most seizures of
ships or goods by foreign powers, for example, matter little to the
average individual who is unaffected by the outcome of the crisis.
Contrast these cases, however, with any threat of occupation . . . of
homeland territories. While rarer, these are the issues that will
galvanize public opinion in the threatened state. Leader
pronouncements will be watched closely by the public, and there will
be less room available for the leader to maneuver during the crisis. . . .
. . . There is good evidence that territorial issues may be one of the
most consistently salient issues to domestic populations.14

The long-simmering disputes over Hans Island and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands do not remain unresolved because politicians
are unaware that sovereign territory may be bought and sold.15 They
remain unresolved because these politicians do not wish to incur the
audience costs that would be imposed if the leaders were to back down.
Recall that all of these islands are uninhabited. Presumably, the
audience costs would be even higher if the region in question were
inhabited.
When viewed through the lens of audience costs, the introduction
of cash payments to these disputes seems unlikely to have a meaningful
impact on a national leader’s incentives to participate in a voluntary
market for sovereign control, at least on the seller side.16 The fact that
13. Douglas M. Gibler & Marc L. Hutchison, Territorial Issues, Audience Costs, and the
Democratic Peace: The Importance of Issue Salience, 75 J. POL. 879, 882–83 (2013).
14. Id.
15. See Stephen M. Walt, Why Doesn’t China Just Buy the Senkaku Islands?, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Sept. 21, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/why-doesnt-china-just-buy-thesenkaku-islands-updated [https://perma.cc/3JBC-C4LA] (“The main obstacle to this obvious
solution [buying the islands] is nationalism. China regards the islands as Chinese territory, so why
should they pay Japan in order to get something they think is rightfully theirs? Similarly, some
Japanese might regard selling the islands as an affront to their own national pride, or something
like that, even though nobody in Japan is likely to live there or even get anywhere near the remote
little rocks.”).
16. James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L ORG. 379, 389–90 (1995)
(“In practice, creating intermediate settlements with cash . . . often seems difficult or impossible
for states engaged in a dispute. . . . [N]ineteenth- and twentieth-century leaders cannot divide up
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the parent nation will receive a sum of money is of little consequence
to a leader who will be pilloried and driven out of office if the territory
is lost.17 Ceding sovereign territory to another nation in exchange for
cash is rarely a winning political strategy.18 Even when Greece was
mired in a devastating economic crisis and considering leaving the
Eurozone, its leaders steadfastly refused to consider the idea of selling
any of its islands. As one Greek politician put it: “It’s an affront . . . .
It’s basically saying sell the memory of your ancestors, sell your history
just so we can get something commercial for it . . . . This is an idea to
humiliate Greeks.”19
In short, the political obstacles to the successful conclusion of
friendly deals in the market for sovereign control are immense. Blocher
and Gulati acknowledge this. They devote an entire section of their
Article to addressing what they call the “impossibility” argument.20
They concede that the “attachment to land might well be resistant to
pricing” and that “domestic political pressure will probably prefer
acquisition or retention of territory . . . to a change in the inscrutable
national balance sheet.”21 They do not, however, suggest any
mechanism by which these political obstacles may be overcome. This
and trade territory in international negotiations as easily as could rulers in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries[.]”).
17. Pass the Hemlock, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/ 2153
8697 [https://perma.cc/4VU5-YPE6] (“[A]s long as Greece remains a democracy, the political,
and perhaps biological, lifespan of a leader who proposed hauling down the flag over even the
tiniest Aegean outcrop would be measured in hours.”).
18. See John Ibbitson, How Will Quebec React?, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 12, 2003, at A25
(“Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien all had reason to fear that
they could be the prime minister who lost Quebec.”); John Stevens & Tom McTague, David
Cameron Could Be Forced to Resign as Prime Minister if Scotland Votes ‘Yes’ to Independence,
Warns Top Tory, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2723916/
David-Cameron-forced-resign-Prime-Minister-Scotland-votes-Yes-independence-warns-Tory.
html [https://perma.cc/2S4H-GL4W] (quoting a member of parliament as saying that “[h]e would
become known as the prime minister who gambled on keeping Scotland in the union and lost his
gamble. [It would be] very difficult in those circumstances to see how he could continue for any
very great length of time”); Rigoberto D. Tiglao, Opinion, Aquino, the First President to
Lose Philippine Territory, MANILA TIMES (May 31, 2015), http://www.manilatimes.net/aquinothe-first-president-to-lose-philippine-territory/188031 [https://perma.cc/8MSX-GJR5] (“I was
shocked at this reality that we have lost Panatag Shoal, and angry with this government . . . . I
think the Chinese haven’t stopped laughing at the Aquino government, rolling on the ground as
they point their fingers at Trillanes and del Rosario.”).
19. Simon Shuster, Greek May Have to Sell Islands and Ruins Under Its Bailout Deal, TIME
(July 13, 2015), http://time.com/3956017/greece-bailout-selloff [https://perma.cc/4GYW-KV4B].
20. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 837–40.
21. Id. at 837.
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omission is important because they suggest that the creation of a
market for sovereign control has the potential to bring about real
change in the real world. They note that the “practical implications [of
their proposal] are significant,”22 that their “framework suggests
possible solutions . . . to . . . difficult practical questions,”23 and that the
framework “point[s] toward practical solutions by helping to identify
the legal, political, ethical, or other obstacles that prevent welfareenhancing border changes.”24 These statements notwithstanding,
Blocher and Gulati devote little attention to the issue of how to
persuade national leaders in seller nations to participate in friendly
deals for the sale of sovereign control.25 Until these leaders’ incentives
change, however, it is difficult to see how a robust market for sovereign
control will develop.
II. HOSTILE DEALS IN THE MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CONTROL
In a hostile deal concluded in the market for sovereign control,
one sovereign refuses to consent to the annexation of one of its regions
by another sovereign. In these cases, Blocher and Gulati argue that the
annexation may occur over the objection of the parent nation so long
as three conditions are met. First, the region’s citizens must have been
mildly oppressed by the parent nation.26 Second, the region’s citizens
must vote in favor of the transfer.27 If each of these two conditions is
satisfied, then control over the region will pass to the new sovereign.
The former parent nation will, however, be entitled to compensation
for the loss. This payment of compensation is Blocher and Gulati’s
third condition.
In order to facilitate the conclusion of hostile deals, Blocher and
Gulati argue that international law should be rewritten to incorporate
the three conditions outlined above. Where a region’s citizens have
been mistreated in some manner, and wish to join up with a new
sovereign, international law should mandate that they be permitted to
22. Id. at 804.
23. Id. at 805.
24. Id. at 804, 805, 843.
25. The international-relations literature relating to succession suggests that these
workarounds are likely to vary depending on the individual circumstances of each state. See Ryan
Griffiths, Secession and the Invisible Hand of the International System, 40 REV. INT’L STUD. 559,
580–81 (2014).
26. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 819–20.
27. Id. at 819.
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do so. At the same time, international law should also mandate that
compensation be paid to the former parent nation. Once these rules
are implemented, Blocher and Gulati argue, they will help to bring
about the creation of a market for sovereign control by making it easier
for nations to acquire territory over the objections of other nations.
It is possible, though by no means certain, that the act of rewriting
the rules of international law to incorporate these rules would be
welfare enhancing. It is, however, difficult to envision a scenario under
which any of these rules would ever be accorded the status of law in
the international system. International law rests on the foundation of
state consent.28 The two primary sources of international law are
treaties and CIL.29 Treaties are written agreements between sovereign
nations.30 CIL is created by widespread state practice that is
undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.31 If a state refuses to ratify
a treaty, or if it persistently objects to a rule of CIL, then it will not be
bound by that rule because it will have withheld its consent.32 In order
for the rules proposed by Blocher and Gulati to take effect, therefore,
the states against which these rules may someday be enforced must
consent to their creation. In effect, these states must voluntarily
commit themselves ex ante to a set of rules that could lead to their
dissolution ex post.33 Since the overriding goal of sovereign states in the
international system is self-preservation, it is not clear why any existing
state would ever grant its consent to such a rule.34 Why would any
28. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2005).
29. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 25–36.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id. at 25–27.
32. This is the persistent-objector doctrine. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757,
765 n.90 (2001). Many would argue that all states are bound, regardless of consent, by norms that
have attained the status of jus cogens. See Connie de la Vega, Jus Cogens, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 301, 301 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009). This is the basis for the doctrine of
remedial secession, which gives regions the rights to secede if their inhabitants are subjected to
widespread human rights violations. See Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the
Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo
and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2009). Claims of “mild” oppression, however, do not
constitute jus cogens violations and hence are not exempt from the consent requirement.
33. See John Hickman, The New Territorial Imperative, 29 COMP. STRATEGY 405, 409–10
(2010) (“Sovereign territorial states appear ‘hardwired’ to acquire additional territory when
opportunities arise because new territory represents potential additional power resources in their
interaction with other states.”).
34. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. 2, § 16 (1854) (“[E]very nation
is obliged to perform the duty of self-preservation.”); Richard A. Falk, Book Review: Philosophy
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nation agree to be bound by a rule that would make it easier for rival
nations to poach its territory over its objections?
Even if these proposed rules were to come into existence
somehow, moreover, it is not clear who would enforce them against
non-compliant states. If a parent nation refused to permit a region to
exit in exchange for consideration, what remedies would be available
to the region? Although they are not explicit on this point, Blocher and
Gulati seem to contemplate a role for international tribunals in
enforcing these rules against non-compliant parent nations.35 If a
parent nation is unwilling to permit a region to break away in the first
instance, however, then it is not at all clear why it would change its
position in response to a decision by an international tribunal.36 To be
sure, the threat of force may induce compliance with these rules. The
very need to threaten force would, however, undo many (if not all) of
the benefits of the market framework that Blocher and Gulati propose.
Consider a scenario in which Tibet wants to secede from China
and become a part of Nepal. The citizens of Tibet have legitimate
complaints of oppression. Against all odds, China permits the citizens
of Tibet to hold a referendum.37 In this referendum, the citizens of
Tibet vote overwhelmingly to join Nepal. A consortium of wealthy
nations offers to pay a massive sum of money to China to compensate
it for the loss of Tibet. In response, China refuses to accept the money,
of International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 907 (2008) (arguing that the efficacy of international
law has been “fatally undermined in the modern era by its overriding . . . embrace of an
unconditional, sovereign right of self-preservation as the final arbiter of behavior in world
politics”); Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International
Society, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 745, 748 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 1991) (“In the present society of sovereign states, the most promising candidate for [their]
supreme interest would be self-preservation of the state.”).
35. See, e.g., Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 821 (suggesting that if a parent nation were
dissatisfied with the market-determined price for an exiting region, it could seek review by an
international body such as the International Court of Justice).
36. The parent nation could, moreover, prevent the tribunal from hearing the dispute by
refusing to consent to its jurisdiction. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v.
Fr./UK/U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 19, 32 (June 15); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 832 (1997).
37. In the real world, China would assuredly take steps to ensure that no referendum were
ever held. The ability of a parent state to block a referendum in the region—an essential
component in Blocher and Gulati’s proposed framework—represents still another obstacle that
would need to be addressed in order for hostile deals to proceed over the objection of the current
parent state.
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ignores the results of the vote, and deploys several brigades to patrol
the border between Nepal and Tibet. China announces to the world
that Tibet is a part of China and will remain a part of China. Nepal
knows that it would lose any military conflict with China. No other
nation is willing to intervene militarily on Tibet’s behalf. What is the
most likely outcome? Tibet remains a part of China. Significantly, this
is the most likely outcome even if the fact that the rules proposed by
Blocher and Gulati have formally become a part of international law
and all of the conditions for a transfer pursuant to those rules have
been satisfied. The existence of a valid and binding international-law
rule relating to sovereign control is, in short, meaningless in the
absence of a valid and effective mechanism for enforcing that rule
against nations that refuse to comply.
This is not the only enforcement challenge implicated by Blocher
and Gulati’s proposal. If a nation has successfully annexed a piece of
territory from another nation over its objections, how can the nation
on the losing end of the transfer force the new parent nation to pay
compensation? This question is presented in the ongoing dispute over
Crimea. On March 16, 2014, the residents of Crimea voted to leave
Ukraine and become a part of Russia.38 The Ukrainian government
protested the legitimacy of the vote and argued that the secession was
illegal. Russia ignored these protests and quickly moved to assert
military and political control over Crimea. Under Blocher and Gulati’s
framework, Russia would be obligated to pay compensation to
Ukraine. Russia does not, however, want to pay such compensation.
Indeed, it will vigorously resist any attempt to force it to do so. Ukraine
will argue that Russia must pay. Russia will refuse. Ukraine will insist.
Russia will again refuse.
At this point, Ukraine will have only two options. First, it could go
to war with Russia. This course of action may not be attractive for any
number of reasons, not the least of which being the very real possibility
that Ukraine would lose the war and suffer a further loss of territory.
Second, Ukraine could ask an international tribunal to force Russia to
pay it the compensation that it is owed. Russia is, however, unlikely to
agree to submit the dispute to an international tribunal.39 Even if CIL

38. Thomas D. Grant, Current Developments: Annexation of Crimea, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 68,
69 (2015).
39. A possible exception, as noted above, is when massive human rights violations trigger a
right of remedial secession. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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were somehow rewritten to give Ukraine a right to compensation, it
would have no obvious means of forcing Russia to comply with its
obligation to pay without resorting to force.40
There exist, in other words, significant practical obstacles arising
from (1) the process through which international law is made and (2)
the enforcement of international law against non-compliant states.
These obstacles make it difficult to imagine how the hostile deals
envisaged by Blocher and Gulati will come together. Indeed, one might
question whether the framework that Blocher and Gulati describe is,
strictly speaking, one that facilitates market transactions. Market
transactions are generally understood to refer to voluntary exchanges
between willing buyers and sellers. Friendly deals, in other words. To
describe a payment by Russia to Ukraine to compensate it for the
annexation of Crimea as a market transaction is to stretch the
definition of that term to its breaking point. An ex post payment to
compensate one actor for property that has been seized by another is
typically characterized as a tort remedy, not a market transaction.
Another way of conceptualizing the framework that Blocher and
Gulati propose, therefore, is as a system of compensated takings.41
Assuming certain conditions are met, one nation may legally annex the
territory of another. The nation whose territory is taken shall, however,
be entitled to a remedy in tort for damages. This arrangement may be
welfare enhancing. It may lead to beneficial cross-border competition

40. In the specific case of Crimea, Ukraine could (in theory) ask the English judge overseeing
a dispute between itself and Russia relating to a $3 billion loan to give it a setoff to compensate it
for the loss of Crimea. See Elaine Moore & Neil Buckley, Ukraine’s “You Invaded Us” Debt NonPayment Defense, FIN. TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/976b426c-2424-11e6aa98-db1e01fabc0c [https://perma.cc/57EH-REB5]. In order for a judge to order such a setoff,
however, he would first have to conclude that international law mandates that compensation be
paid. Since Russia has ratified no treaty to that effect, and since it would almost certainly object
to any attempt to develop such a rule via CIL, there would be no legal basis for the setoff,
notwithstanding the fact that both states have consented to the jurisdiction of the English court.
In addition, the bonds in question affirmatively prohibit set offs. In order for Ukraine to prevail
on this point, therefore, it would also have to persuade the English court to disregard that
particular clause.
41. This insight is implicit in Blocher and Gulati’s proposal that a nation’s sovereignty rights
be made subject to a liability rule rather than a property rule. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1,
at 803; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing distinction
between property rules and liability rules).
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between and among governments. It is not, however, a “market”
transaction as that term is traditionally understood.42
CONCLUSION
International law has long recognized the ability of sovereigns to
buy and sell territory in friendly deals. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, such sales were common. In the years after 1945,
however, they essentially ceased to occur. The sudden halt in such sales
is not attributable to any new rule of international law. Nor is it
attributable to a lack of awareness that they are permitted. In recent
years, commentators have called for (1) the United Kingdom to sell
Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland,43 (2) Japan to sell the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to China,44 (3) India to offer to purchase parts
of Kashmir from Pakistan,45 and (4) the United Kingdom to sell the
Falkland Islands to Argentina.46 The obstacles are political, and they
are largely intractable. Until these political obstacles are addressed, it
is difficult to see how a market for sovereign control for friendly deals
will develop.
With respect to hostile deals in which one nation is forced to cede
a region to another nation against its wishes, there is no existing rule of
international law that would require the ceding nation to relinquish its
sovereignty. There is also no rule that would require that a payment be
made to compensate a nation that loses a region. Blocher and Gulati
propose that these rules can and should change. They argue that
nations should be required to cede territories to other sovereigns when
42. In transactions that occur pursuant to a liability-rule regime, the courts will set the price
and may order the exchange to proceed over the objections of one of the parties. See generally
Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 232
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). In light of these attributes, some scholars have
described liability-rule exchanges as “involuntary” or “non-market” transactions. See, e.g.,
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2010); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1719, 1777 (2004).
43. See Mary Dejevsky, Opinion, Is It Time to Sell Northern Ireland to the Republic?,
BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/is-it-time-tosell-northern-ireland-to-the-republic-28556047.html [https://perma.cc/RT5H-DGCQ].
44. See Walt, supra note 15.
45. Jug Suraiya, India Should Offer to Buy ‘Azad Kashmir’ from Pakistan, TIMES OF INDIA
BLOGS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/states-estatesindia-should-offer-to-buy-azad-kashmir-from-pakistan [https://perma.cc/A6VP-HPM7].
46. PETITION TO SELL THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO PAY THE UK DEFICIT
https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/26149 [https://perma.cc/2GDS-Z6TW].
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the region’s citizens are ill-treated and vote to exit, subject to the
condition that the ceding nation be compensated for its loss. It is,
however, difficult to see why the nations of the world would consent to
the creation of any of these rules. Nor is it easy to see how these rules
would be enforced against nations that refuse to comply or why these
exchanges should be characterized as market transactions as opposed
to compensated takings. Blocher and Gulati deserve credit for writing
a fascinating article that explores the benefits that may flow from
making it easier to transfer sovereignty from one nation to another.
There are, however, a great many challenges that would need to be
overcome before their vision becomes a reality.

